



## Chapter 5

# In Search of the Elixir of Happiness: Concepts of Rational and Spiritual Learning in Classical Islam<sup>1</sup>

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The daughter of time, truth is also the daughter of geographic space. Cities are the centres of the traffic of men, full of ideas as well as merchandise, places of exchange, the marketplaces and crossroads of intellectual commerce.

In his book *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages*, the French historian Jacques Le Goff (1924–2014) expresses this idea to open a chapter on the twelfth-century Greek–Arabic contribution to Europe’s cultural flourishing.<sup>2</sup> For along with the precious fabrics, spices and other rare merchandise arriving from Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo and Cordoba, Arabic manuscripts too were reaching the Christian West. These texts in turn brought Europe into contact with ideas from Arabic-Islamic civilization, and from the ancient Greek and the Iranian-Indian intellectual worlds. Many of these ideas had been translated into Arabic during the time of the Abbasid Empire, whose capital Baghdad was a flourishing intercultural center in the eighth to tenth centuries. The prominent translation activities of the Christian scholar Hunayn ibn Ishaq (d. circa 873) and his students laid “a foundation for the continuation of rationalist Galenic medicine amongst Muslim physicians and, through their mediation, also in

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- 1 This chapter is an adapted version of my article, “Auf der Suche nach dem Elixier der Glückseligkeit: Konzeptionen rationaler und spiritueller Bildung im Klassischen Islam,” in Peter Gemeinhardt and Tobias Georges (eds.), *Theologie und Bildung im Mittelalter* (Archa Verbi: Subsidia 13), Münster: Aschendorff 2015, 111–128. My sincere thanks go to Tony Crawford, Berlin, for translating this study from the German. Translations from the Arabic are those of the author except where otherwise indicated. Qur’ān passages are quoted in the translations of Muhammad A. S. Abdel Haleem and Arthur J. Arberry.
  - 2 Jacques Le Goff, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), 14.

the medieval West.”<sup>3</sup> Philosophical and scientific texts were intensely studied and commented upon by Muslim scholars before embarking, so to speak, on the journey to Europe, or back to Europe, thus completing a round trip with Arabic as an intermediate stage.

The European intellectuals were primarily interested in Arabic works on the natural sciences, medicine, philosophy, and logic. Latin translations of books eagerly studied by medieval European scholars included the works of the Muslim polymath Jabir ibn Hayyan (Latinized as Geber; d. circa 815), often called “the father of chemistry” in the modern history of science; the mathematical treatises of al-Khwarizmi (Latinized as Algorithmi; d. between 835 and 850), renowned for his work on algebra; the pioneering textbooks on surgery by Abu l-Qasim al-Zahrawi (Albucasis, d. 1013), and the crucial experiments in optics by Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen, d. circa 1040). However, medieval European scholars were also well acquainted with books by the philosopher and logician Abu Nasr al-Farabi (Alpharabius, d. 950), the polymath, philosopher and physician Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 1035), and the philosopher, legal scholar and physician Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198), to mention only a few names of particularly remarkable classical Muslim scholars.

These examples of the influences of Arabic-Islamic scholarship in the history of European intellectual culture and sciences could be multiplied many times over, and a good number of pertinent topics have already been studied and brought to the attention of wider audiences by Islamicists, medievalists, and scholars of the history of the sciences.<sup>4</sup> One area, however, which has been in the focus of scholarly interest only more recently, is the philosophy of education in classical Islam. Yet a comprehensive analysis of the foundations, development, and characteristics of the classical pedagogical tradition in Islam, and of its significance in the context of the European reception of the Arabic-Islamic intellectual heritage, is still lacking.<sup>5</sup>

The present text is therefore intended to convey some insights into the complex and fascinating world of Muslim theories of education during the classical period of Islam—that is, during the flourishing of Islamic culture and civilization from the ninth to the fifteenth century. After a few remarks on pertinent passages in the Qurʾān, we will examine three particularly prominent

3 Gotthard Strohmaier, “Hunayn b. Ishāq,” in *EP Online*, [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_ei3\\_COM\\_30560](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_30560).

4 See, for example, George Saliba, *Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance* (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2007, 2011).

5 A handbook of classical Islamic theories of education is currently being prepared by the author of the present article. For an extensive collection of essays on the historical developments, ideals, and practices of Islamic learning and teaching in the formative and classical periods of Islam, see Sebastian Günther, ed., *Knowledge and Education in Classical Islam: Religious Learning between Continuity and Change*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2020).

classical Muslim scholars who ascribed a special priority in human existence to the human aspiration for knowledge, individual and collective perfection, and happiness. Our discussion will be focused, first, on the central role in the process of teaching and learning which these medieval Muslim theologians, philosophers and legal scholars attributed to “reason”—that is, the human ability to mentally apprehend things and facts, and to draw logical inferences and learn from them. The discussion will also deal with the spiritual-mystical approach to knowledge of God and the world which is practised mainly by Sufis—the mystics in Islam—and which has had a special importance throughout the history of Islam in the Muslims’ search for the true path to human perfection and salvation—in other words, the “elixir of happiness.” The term “happiness” (Arabic: *sa‘ādah*) or “elixir of happiness” (Persian: *kīmiyā-yi sa‘ādat*) occurs in the titles of works by several medieval Muslim scholars, in both Arabic and Persian, which deal with aspects of learning, education, and human development from the perspectives of different scholarly disciplines.<sup>6</sup> These classical Muslim scholars not only address ideas such as happiness, felicity and contentment (with their interrelated meanings and differences) as found in the Qur’ān,<sup>7</sup> the Islamic prophetic tradition and the Arabic wisdom literature; they also discuss in depth classical Greek ideas, especially those of Plato (d. 348/7 BCE) and Aristotle (d. 322 BCE), and the philosophical tradition which centers on the Greek term *eudaemonia*, also understood to mean happiness, welfare, good spirits, et cetera. In closing, this contribution will touch on the question to what extent concepts of reason and the heart, which are central to classical Islamic theories of knowledge transfer and education, contain ideas that are relevant and worthy of consideration—above and beyond their historic interest—for the world of education in the twenty-first century.

## The Qur’ān on Reason

The Qur’ān, the revealed scripture promulgated by the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century—and the first book of Islam—contains a number of statements on imparting and acquiring religious and secular knowledge, on cogni-

6 Such works include *Taḥṣīl al-Sa‘ādah* (*The Book of Attaining Happiness*) and *Kitāb Tanbīh ‘alā Sabīl al-Sa‘ādah* (*The Reminder of the Way of Happiness*), both by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950); *Kitāb al-Sa‘ādah wa-l-Is‘ād* (*The Book of [Attaining] Happiness and Helping [Others] to Attain it*) by Abū l-Ḥasan al-‘Āmirī (d. 992); *Kitāb al-Sa‘ādah* (*The Book of Happiness*) by Miskawayh (d. 1030); *Kīmiyā-yi sa‘ādat* (*The Elixir of Happiness*), a Persian text by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111); and *Miftāḥ Dār al-Sa‘ādah* (*The Key to the Abode of Happiness*) by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 1350).

7 Cf. Charles J. Adams, “Joy and Misery,” in *Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān*, General Editor: Johanna Pink, accessed July 24, 2023, [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-3922\\_q3\\_EQSIM\\_00243](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-3922_q3_EQSIM_00243); Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Happiness and the Attainment of Happiness: An Islamic Perspective,” *Journal of Law and Religion* 29, no. 1 (2014): 76–91.

tive understanding, and on the education of the faithful as individuals and as a community. It is striking that the Qurʾān explicitly points out the benefits and merits of knowledge, knowledge acquisition, and the cognitive faculty. In Sura 39, verse 9, for example, God poses the rhetorical question, “How can those who know be equal to those who do not know?” The answer comes in the next sentence: “Only those who have understanding will take heed” (trans. Abdel Haleem).

By the same token, the Qurʾān urges people to make active use of their intellect (*ʿaql*). In Sura 2, verse 44, and in many other passages of the Qurʾānic revelation, God affirms His requirement that the people believe in Him—and only in Him. This commandment is underscored with a stylistic device also used in the Bible, an epiplectic rhetorical question: “Do you not understand?” (trans. Arberry).<sup>8</sup>

Sura 59, verse 2, contains a statement which gave medieval Muslim theologians and philosophers food for thought. The Qurʾānic exhortation “Learn from this, all of you with insight!” (trans. Abdel Haleem) is understood by major classical Muslim exegetes to mean that the use of reason is, from a religious perspective, not only possible or permitted, but indeed required of human beings by divine commandment. Ibn Rushd goes so far as to state, in his *Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom*, that “the Law calls for consideration of existing things by means of the intellect and for pursuing cognizance of them by means of it.”<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Ibn Rushd writes, the religiously defined law in Islam, the Sharia, not only explicitly requires and facilitates rational thinking and the scientific investigation of the real world, but safeguards and sanctions it.<sup>10</sup>

Sura 65, verse 10–11, is equally pertinent to our topic. Here we find the exhortation to humanity: “So, you who have understanding, you who believe, beware of God. He has sent you the Qurʾān. . . to bring those who believe and do righteous deeds from darkness into light” (trans. Abdel Haleem). In other

8 For Biblical examples of epiplexis (etymologically from Greek, ‘chastisement’), also known as *epitimesis*, as a sophisticated rhetorical device to reprove or reprimand rather than to elicit an answer, see Ethelbert William Bullinger, *Figures of Speech Used in the Bible: Explained and Illustrated* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, and New York: E. & J. B. Young, 1898), 930–931.

9 Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rushd, *Averroës: The Book of the Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom and Epistle Dedicatory; Kitāb Faṣl al-maqāl wa-taqrīr mā bayna l-sharīʿah wa-l-ḥikmah min al-Ittiṣāl, Risālat al-ihdāʾ*, Arabic–English, trans. and ed. Charles E. Butterworth (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2008), 2.

10 Ibn Rushd, *The Decisive Treatise*, 2–4. See also Sebastian Günther, “Ibn Rushd and Thomas Aquinas on Education,” in *The Heritage of Arabo-Islamic Learning: Studies Presented to Wadad Kadi*, ed. Maurice A. Pomerantz and Aram A. Shahin (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016), 256; Sebastian Günther, “Das Buch ist ein Gefäß gefüllt mit Wissen und Scharfsinn: Pädagogische Ratschläge klassischer muslimischer Denker,” in *Von Rom nach Bagdad: Bildung und Religion von der römischen Kaiserzeit bis zum klassischen Islam*, ed. Peter Gemeinhardt und Sebastian Günther (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 374–375.

words, people are to perceive and reflect on God and the world not only with their hearts, but also rationally, in order to find God and to surrender fully to God's will. Accordingly, cognitive, rational learning—in addition to the spiritual experience of God—is accorded a central role in the Qurʾān and in Islamic religion in general in regard to education, in both secular and religious respects.

## Teaching and Learning in Classical Islam

Books and other written documents became mainstays of Arabic-Islamic culture. This development is important for two reasons: because reflection “on this world and the next” (Qurʾān 2:219–220, trans. Abdel Haleem), careful thinking, studying “the creation of the heavens and earth” (Qurʾān 3:191), and education were sanctioned in the Qurʾān and in the Ḥadīth, the extensive Islamic literature on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad,<sup>11</sup> and because of the new social and material conditions of the rapidly growing Islamic empire in the ninth and tenth centuries. In fact, Arabic-Islamic civilization developed in the ninth to thirteenth centuries into what we may call a knowledge society.<sup>12</sup> The Muslims' interest in works of ancient Greek science and medicine burgeoned especially in the eighth to tenth centuries in the Arabic-Islamic empire. But it was not only the scholars and the upper class who were interested in the works of the ancient Greeks, Iranians, and Indians, and who were willing to pay a great deal of money for Arabic translations of them: the demand for ancient knowledge grew visibly in other social classes of the Abbasid empire as well—among administrative officials and merchants, for example. Much of this interest was directed at Greek philosophy and logic, two fields

11 See also Abdel Haleem's introduction in *The Qur'an* xlv, no. 4 (*The Qur'an: A New Translation* by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), on the importance attached to reading, learning, knowledge and “the pen” in the first revelation received by the Prophet Muhammad: Sebastian Günther, “Teaching,” in *EQ*, vol. 5, Leiden: Brill, 2006, 200–205.

12 The famous palace library of the early Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad, the *Bayt al-Ḥikmah* or House of Wisdom, probably served, as recent studies have shown, mainly to collect and preserve the ancient Iranian and early Arabic-Islamic literary heritage. There is insufficient evidence for the notion—often repeated in the Islamic studies literature—that it was a kind of “translation academy” where philosophical and scientific works of ancient Greek culture were professionally translated into Arabic. See Dimitri Gutas and Kevin van Bladel, “Bayt al-Ḥikma,” in *EP* Online, accessed July 26, 2020, [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_ei3\\_COM\\_22882](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_22882); Damien Janos, “Al-Maʾmūn's Patronage of Astrology: Some Biographical and Institutional Considerations,” in *The Place to Go: Contexts of Learning in Baghdād, 750–1000 C.E.*, ed. Jens Scheiner and Damien Janos (Princeton: Darwin Press 2014), esp. 439–440. Another outstanding scholarly establishment was the *Dār al-Ḥikmah* or House of Wisdom in Cairo (also known as *Dār al-ʿIlm*, the House of Knowledge), a higher education institution with a research library, founded in 1005 by the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim.

which would develop into an integral part of Islamic intellectual culture in the centuries to follow.

### Farabi (c. 872–950)

An especially prominent and original Muslim scholar who made intensive and creative use of the ancient heritage in his own writings was the tenth-century author Abu Nasr al-Farabi. Farabi was not only a famous Muslim philosopher; he was also an outstanding music theoretician and probably the first true logician in the history of Muslim scholarship. He had studied ancient Greek philosophy with famous Christian teachers in Iraq.

Farabi's own philosophical works were influential among Muslim, Christian and Jewish scholars not only in the Islamic world, but also in medieval Europe.<sup>13</sup> An example is his *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm* (*The Enumeration of the Sciences*), a foundational work on the classification of the sciences which was translated into Latin in Cordoba in the twelfth century by the Italian scholar Gerard of Cremona, and into Hebrew in the thirteenth century by Moses ibn Tibbon, a native of Marseille. Farabi wrote commentaries on Aristotle's *Organon* and on the works of Ptolemy and Alexander of Aphrodisias. He is also the author of an introduction to Plato's *Nómoi* (*Laws*).<sup>14</sup>

An annotated summary of the teachings of Plato and Aristotle is found in Farabi's work *al-Jamʿ bayna raʿyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflātūn al-ilāhī wa-Aristūṭālīs* (*The Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages Plato the Divine and Aristotle*).<sup>15</sup> In regard to education, this book discusses the Platonic idea that learning is recollection: "Learning is but undertaking to know, and recollection undertaking to remember."<sup>16</sup> Farabi adds to this idea the didactic insight that all teach-

13 Among the numerous Farabi studies, Fakhry's *Al-Fārābī* [sic], *Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism*, and Rudolph's *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, in *Philosophy in the Islamic World*, 526–654, provide particularly useful outlines of Farabi's works, their characteristics, and their significance in the philosophical traditions of Islam.

14 See especially Joshua Parens, *Metaphysics as Rhetoric: Alfarabi's Summary of Plato's Laws* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995).

15 The first Arabic edition is included in *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, "*Kitāb al-Jamʿ bayna raʿyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflātūn al-ilāhī wa-Aristūṭālīs*," in *Alfārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen: Aus Londoner, Leidener und Berliner Handschriften*, ed. Friedrich Dieterici (Leiden: Brill, 1890), 1–33; and a German translation in *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, "*Die Harmonie zwischen Plato und Aristoteles*," in *Alfārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen*, trans. Friedrich Dieterici (Leiden: Brill, 1892), 1–53. For a more recent edition, cf. *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, *al-Jamʿ bayna raʿyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflātūn al-ilāhī wa-Aristūṭālīs*, ed. Albīr Naṣrī Nādir (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1960); and for an English translation, see *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, *Alfarabi: The Political Writings: Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts*, trans. and annot. Charles E. Butterworth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 117–167.

16 *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, "Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle," in *Alfarabi: The Political Writings. Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts*, by *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, trans. and annot. Charles E. Butterworth, 115–168 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

ing must be facilitated by drawing primarily on ideas and concepts with which the students are already familiar (*maʿānī mā kāna fī nafsihi qadīman*). He states:

Another instance, too, is what Plato expounds in his book known as the *Phaedo*: that learning is recollection. He illustrates that by proofs he recounts from the questioning and answering Socrates had with Simmias on the subject of the equal and equality. That is, equality exists in the soul, and when a human being senses the equal—like a piece of wood or anything else equal to something else—he recollects the equality that is in his soul and thus knows that this equal is equal only due to an equality similar to that existing in the soul. And likewise, the rest of what he learns is only his recollecting what is in the soul.<sup>17</sup>

Understanding this principle makes teachers more effective and students faster and more efficient in learning new subject matter. Otherwise, it is difficult for students to grasp new information and ideas; they may not be able to study them successfully. In this context, Farabi also suggests that identification of, and reliance on, “indications” (*ʿalāmāt*), “directions” (*dalāʾil*), and “meanings” (*maʿānī*) of what was previously in the soul of the student are helpful in his instruction. Indeed, “it is as though he recollects it at that point.”<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, instruction must be both gradual and focused. The teacher should begin with one definite topic or argument and then broaden the discussion to deal with more general matters.<sup>19</sup>

Farabi also uses his critique of Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on learning to show how knowledge acquisition and instruction may work. He demonstrates, for example, how to survey and analyze sources of expertise and how to extract information from them. He goes on to name and explain different categories, levels, and characteristics of knowledge and, finally, identifies certain difficulties students may encounter in learning. However, he also indicates remedies that may help the learner to overcome such problems and eventually experience success in learning,<sup>20</sup> so that the student “becomes calm, feels assured, and delights in being released from the pain of perplexity and ignorance.”<sup>21</sup> Thus, as Charles Butterworth observed, Farabi presents “Plato’s philosophical quest as beginning with the inquiry into human perfection and thus human happiness,” leading him to an investigation of the different kinds

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University Press, 2001), 150 (no. 47), 151 (no. 51).

17 Al-Fārābī, “Harmonization,” 150, no. 47.

18 Al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Jamʿ* (ed. Dieterici), 21; al-Fārābī, “Harmonization,” 152.

19 Sebastian Günther, “The Principles of Instruction are the Grounds of our Knowledge: al-Fārābī’s Philosophical and al-Ghazālī’s Spiritual Approaches to Learning,” in *Trajectories of Education in the Arab World: Legacies and Challenges*, ed. Osama Abi-Mershed (London: Routledge, 2010), 20.

20 Günther, “The Principles,” 20, 26–27.

21 Al-Fārābī, “Harmonization,” 151 (no. 50).

of knowledge, the practical arts, the qualities of the soul, the importance of love and friendship, philosophy and statesmanship, the quest for what is truly good, and the significance of conversation for instruction.<sup>22</sup>

In his *Talkhīṣ nawāmīs Aflāṭūn* (*Clarifying Summary of the Laws of Plato*), a treatment of this and other ideas on teaching and learning which he aptly attributes to Plato and Aristotle, Farabi emphasizes the importance of argument, dialogue, and discourse as forms of imparting and acquiring knowledge. Farabi notes that an argument is an efficient means of theoretical learning, while dialogue and discourse are particularly suited to teach students about the true nature of things and to introduce them to accurate knowledge of things and ideas.<sup>23</sup>

The classification and analysis of the forms, properties and conditions of knowledge are important elements in Farabi's system of thought, which deals extensively with conceptions of education, human perfection, and happiness. This is particularly evident in his remarkable philosophical treatise titled *Mabādi' ārā' ahl al-madīnah al-fāḍilah* (*The Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Virtuous City*, also known as *The Perfect State*). In this work, the author develops a metaphysical system which combines Qur'ānic notions of God and the world with political conceptions of classical Greek origin. Plato's model of an ideal republic (Greek: *politeia*) plays a central role in this system.

In *The Perfect State*, Farabi discusses at length the importance of sensory perception and the process of thinking in aspirations to human perfection and happiness. He finds that the highest degree of happiness is attained by a person possessed of the "Active Intellect" (*al-ʿaql al-faʿāl*, defined as the kind of permanent intelligence which is the substance of a unified being) and who applies their rational faculty (*al-quwwah al-nāṭiqah*) to both the theoretical and the practical aspects of life. Such a person is thus particularly qualified to govern in the state by their individual nature and their basic intellectual and ethical disposition.<sup>24</sup> If this person also possesses excellent conceptual and communicative skills, they are physically and psychologically able to lead people on the direct path to happiness (or, at least, able to find ways and means to do so).<sup>25</sup>

Farabi goes on to define happiness as follows:

22 Charles E. Butterworth, introduction to al-Fārābī, "Harmonization," 120.

23 In his *Talkhīṣ Nawāmīs Aflāṭūn*, (ed. Badawī, 40), Farabi quotes Plato in arguing that debates on divine laws (*nawāmīs*) can make some of those laws appear in a disparaging light. This is permissible, however, if the purpose of the debate is to study and analyze such laws. Cf. Günther, "The Principles," 31–32.

24 Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State (Mabādi' ārā' ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah): A Revised Text with Introduction, Translation and Commentary*, trans. Richard Walzer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 203–205, 209, 225, 243–247. See also Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Über die Wissenschaften: De scientiis, Lateinisch-Deutsch, nach der lateinischen Übersetzung Gerards von Cremona, mit einer Einleitung und kommentierten Anmerkungen herausgegeben und übersetzt von Franz Schupp* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), 296–297.

25 Al-Fārābī, *The Perfect State*, 247.

Felicity means that the human soul reaches a degree of perfection in (its) existence where it is in no need of matter for its support. . . . That aim is achieved only by certain voluntary actions.<sup>26</sup>

Because of the latter property, “felicity is the good which is pursued for its own sake.” Furthermore, there is nothing more superb than happiness within human reach.<sup>27</sup>

The voluntary actions which help in attaining felicity are the good actions. . . . But the actions which are an obstacle to felicity are the bad things, namely the evil actions, and the dispositions and habits from which these actions arise are defects, vices and base qualities.<sup>28</sup>

In *The Perfect State*, and in a number of other books as well, Farabi also discusses topics that are important with respect to the theory of education. Farabi sees learning as the total of the following pursuits:

- (i) intellectual and moral education,
- (ii) the acquisition of technical and practical skills; and, most remarkably,
- (iii) what today is called values education.

This last point encompasses the teaching of universal qualities which are attributed to objects, ideas, and patterns of action in moral, social, and individual respects, and which are in turn the basis of creative thinking. For Farabi, the totality of these endeavours is the condition for the attainment of professionalism in the sciences, arts, and vocations to which people aspire, the refinement of human character traits, and the practical application of theoretical knowledge. For it is only the practical application of knowledge which generates new knowledge.<sup>29</sup>

In another of Farabi’s central works, his *Tahṣīl al-Sa’ādah* (*The Attainment of Happiness*), the author argues that people need specific principles and rules to learn. Certain rational, intellectual and ethical principles and rules need to be applied in order for humans to attain the main goals of education, that is, human perfection (*kamāl*) and happiness (*sa’ādah*). Thus humans need to know, investigate, and act according to “the good, virtuous, and noble things,” and avoid everything obstructive to achieving human perfection and happiness—that is, “the evils, the vices, and the base things.”<sup>30</sup> Farabi also notes that there

26 Al-Fārābī, 205–207.

27 Al-Fārābī, 207.

28 Al-Fārābī, 207.

29 Cf. Günther, “The Principles,” 15–35, esp. 16–18.

30 Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, “The Attainment of Happiness,” in *Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, trans. Muhsin Mahdi, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 24 (no. 20).

are different kinds and degrees of human perfection according to the specific position each individual occupies in society.<sup>31</sup>

In *The Attainment of Happiness*, Farabi sketches an Islamic concept of human nature which builds on Greek ideals. Farabi adopts here the central tenet that every person is naturally able to identify his virtuous qualities, develop them, and use them to advantage. Yet it is the duty of those who have responsibility for a polity—as prophets or philosophers have, for example—to ensure the intellectual and ethical education of the members of the polity. Farabi begins his treatise by specifying the necessary qualities:

The human things through which nations and citizens of cities attain earthly happiness in this life and supreme happiness (*al-sa'ādah al-quṣwā*) in the life beyond are of four kinds: theoretical virtues (*al-faḍā'il al-naẓariyyah*), deliberative virtues (*al-faḍā'il al-fikriyyah*), moral virtues (*al-faḍā'il al-khuluqīyyah*), and practical arts (*al-ṣinā'āt al-'amaliyyah*).

Theoretical virtues consist in the sciences whose ultimate purpose is to make the beings and what they contain intelligible (*ma'qūl*) with certainty. This knowledge is in part possessed by the human from the outset without his being aware of it and without perceiving how he acquired it or where it comes from. This is primary knowledge. The rest is acquired by meditation (*ta'ammul*), investigation (*faḥṣ*) and inference (*istinbāt*), instruction (*ta'līm*), and study (*ta'allum*).<sup>32</sup>

Farabi thus conveys the insight that human beings, who are mortal, are capable of attaining the condition of happiness or beatitude in this world, to a certain degree. They can do so by constantly striving for knowledge and education, by the practical application of their knowledge and skills, and by ethical perfection. The condition of “utmost happiness,” however, can only be experienced in the next life.

### Ghazali (1058–1111)

In contrast to Farabi's conceptions on education, human perfection and happiness, which are rooted to a large degree in the rational, Aristotelian tradition, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, the famous eleventh-century theologian, reformer and mystic, puts forward a mystical, spiritual approach to knowledge and cognition.

Ghazali was from Khorasan in central Asia but lived and worked in Baghdad as the head of the Nizamiyyah, perhaps the most important institution of

31 Al-Fārābī, “The Attainment,” 22–23 (nos. 17–18), 37 (no. 43), 46 (no. 57).

32 Al-Fārābī, 13 (nos. 1–2); Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sa'ādah*, ed. 'Alī Bū Muḥim (Beirut: Dār wa-Maktabat al-Hilāl, 1995), 25–26.

higher learning in the Islamic empire in the eleventh century. In addition to his great achievements in the fields of philosophical theology and mysticism, Ghazali also made crucial contributions in numerous works to the theory and practice of religiously oriented Islamic learning. For this reason, I would call him the most influential architect of classical Islamic education. Especially in his magnum opus, the four-volume *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn* (*The Revival of the Religious Sciences*), and in one of his late works on education, *Ayyuhā l-walad* (often literally translated as *O Son*, but more aptly rendered, in view of the work's purpose and content, as *O Novice*), to name just two examples, Ghazali is the author of a comprehensive set of rules with theoretical and practical advice on religiously oriented education in Islam which remains authoritative for the majority of Muslims to the present day.

It is important for the development of Islamic theories of education in general that Ghazali adopted Greek logic as a neutral instrument of knowledge acquisition, and therefore recommended it to theologians; yet at the same time we find, especially in his mystical writings, two key ideas which have proved influential for Islamic theories on knowledge acquisition and education. The first is that Ghazali incorporated certain Aristotelian ethical values in Islamic thought by presenting them as mystical values. The second is Ghazali's principle that the way of mystical knowledge always begins with, or must build on, traditional Islamic faith. With these core tenets, Ghazali established a new approach to religiously oriented education in Islam—an approach which in fact enabled him to combine rational thought and logic with mysticism and orthodox Islamic faith.

Within this framework, Ghazali developed the proposition that reason and sensory perceptions enable a person to acquire rational knowledge of the visible, material world, while the intuition of the heart, divine inspiration, and the knowledge of God's truth as revealed to humans in scripture enable one to understand facets of the invisible, immaterial world. But only the unity of unstinting rational study *and* spiritual exercises allows a person to attain "true knowledge" of certain facets of the divine and to approach God.

In his central work, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*, Ghazali explains that the first duty of every student is to learn the religious practices, for they signify the "knowledge of heart and soul." This aspect of the educational process requires neither analytical thinking nor critical exploration: sincere faith is sufficient. Second, it is important for students to study the religious sciences. These include not only the study of the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth, but also the ancillary subjects, such as Islamic law and linguistics. The prophets teach knowledge of these fields both through the divine revelations they communicate and through their wise sayings and exemplary lives. Especially important in regard to the latter is the Ḥadīth—the Islamic literature of sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and reports on his exemplary life and the

lives of his closest companions. Both a sound intellect and strong faith in the Islamic traditions are necessary, Ghazali writes, in order to learn to live according to these Islamic ideals.

Third and finally, students should also educate themselves in the worldly sciences. These include medicine, the mathematical sciences, and astronomy, as well as the foundations of philosophy and discursive theology, namely logic, physics and metaphysics. The study of the latter fields is reserved, however, to those who have not only a strong intellect, but also good powers of observation and a well-developed aptitude for experimental research.<sup>33</sup>

In addition to such statements on the relation between education and religion, Ghazali primarily formulates ethical criteria for teaching and studying. A fundamental requirement for acquiring knowledge, for example, is for teachers and students to first cleanse their souls of bad character traits, for the human body must first be brought into a condition which is worthy to convey knowledge or to acquire knowledge. Furthermore, Ghazali emphatically advocates that the educational process should take the form of “nurturing instruction” rather than “corrective discipline”—a conception which has developed into a fundamental idea of education in Islam and which is found in numerous texts of later authors which are explicitly devoted to Islamic education.<sup>34</sup>

In this way Ghazali is able to establish a harmony between faith and knowledge. His view is that everything which a person cannot apprehend by reason is comprehensible through faith and trust in God. In other words, what a person cannot learn intellectually about God and the world can be experienced intuitively through the divine revelation and through a spiritual approach to the divine.

Ghazali also states that study and education should serve primarily to stimulate those elements of experience and insight which are naturally inherent in people’s souls in order to lead them to the true path to fulfilment and salvation—that is, to the “straight path” (*al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm*) of those to whom God has shown mercy, the path of those who “incur no anger and who have not gone astray” (trans. Abdel Haleem), as the opening sura of the Qurʾān has it. Hence one should strive for knowledge and perfection with the goal of finding fulfilment and beatitude in this world, yet still more in the world to come. Their whole life long, Ghazali writes, the faithful must direct their hearts, minds, and efforts towards eternal life in the hereafter.

In the treatise *Minhāj al-mutaʿallim* (*The Program of the Learner*), a work the Islamic scholarly tradition attributes to Ghazali, the author states in this respect:

33 Günther, “The Principles,” 22–24.

34 Sebastian Günther, “Be Masters in that You Teach and Continue to Learn: Medieval Muslim Thinkers on Educational Theory,” in “Islam and Education: Myths and Truths,” special issue, *Comparative Education Review* 50, no. 3 (2006): 367–388, esp. 380–382.

كما قيل: كن عالماً أو متعلماً أو مُحبباً لهم، فإنّ الجهل لا يكون معذوراً في الدنيا والآخرة، والمتصف به مغبون فيهما، لأنّ شرفهما مع العلم؛ كما قيل: من أراد الدنيا فليتّجر، ومن أراد الآخرة فليترهّد، ومن أراد كليهما فليتعلم. وإنّ من انتقل من الدنيا بقي ما جمعه فيها سوى العلم، فإنّ العلم رفيقه في القبر، وأنسيه و فراشه من تحته وجنبه وزاده. قال النبيّ عليه السلام: ”من أراد منكم سفراً من أسفار الدنيا فلا يمشي بلا زاد. فكيف تريدون السفر إلى الآخرة بلا زاد؟ ونعم، الزاد العلم، ولا سيّما شفيعه وبراقه وظلّه في يوم القيامة.“

It is said: “Be a teacher or a learner, or someone who appreciates them, for ignorance is not excusable in this life nor in the hereafter, and the person who is characterized by ignorance is at a disadvantage in both worlds, for their esteem depends on knowledge.” It is also said: “He who prefers [life in] this world should be a merchant, and he who longs for the hereafter should devote himself to asceticism; and he who pursues both must learn!”

He who leaves this world will leave behind everything he has accumulated in it—except knowledge! For knowledge is his companion in the grave, his close friend and his cushion on which he rests. It is his provision [for the journey to the next life].

The Prophet—peace be upon him—said, “The one among you who wants to undertake a journey in this world does not travel without provisions. How then can you set out for the next world without provision? And yes, knowledge is his provision [for that journey], his intercessor, steed, protector, and shade-giver on the Day of Resurrection.”<sup>35</sup>

Ghazali gives a similar emphasis to ideas that convey the strong orientation of religious Islamic education towards the next life. This understanding is particularly evident in his late work *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl* (*Deliverance from Error*), where he quotes the widely transmitted maxims of the Prophet Muhammad:

“Whoever acts according to what he knows, God will make him heir to what he does not know;” [. . .] and how right he was in his saying: “Whoever reaches the point where all his cares are a single care, God Most High will save him from all cares in this life and the next.” When you have had that experience in a thousand, two thousand, and many

35 Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, “Minhāj al-Muta‘allim,” in *Al-Turāt at-Tarbawī al-Islāmī fi Khams Makhṭūṭāt*, ed. Hishām Nashāba (Beirut: Dār al-‘Ilm lil-Malāyīn, 1428/2007), 67. For the question of the authenticity of this work, see the editor’s introduction, 49.

thousands of instances, you will have acquired a necessary knowledge which will be indisputable.<sup>36</sup>

### Ibn Rushd (1126–1198)

The third scholar we include in our explorations of the concepts of rational and spiritual education in classical Islam is Abu l-Walid Ibn Rushd, the twelfth-century Spanish Arab philosopher, legal scholar, and physician known in Europe under the latinized form of his name, Averroes.

One of Ibn Rushd's most original works is the treatise titled *Faṣl al-maqāl wa-taqrīr mā bayna l-sharī'ah wa-l-ḥikmah min al-ittiṣāl* (*The Decisive Treatise and Judgement on the Connection between [the Divinely Revealed] Law and Philosophy*). Ibn Rushd first published this book in 1177.

By his own account, the two main purposes of Ibn Rushd's *Decisive Treatise* are, first, to show that the divinely revealed law (*shar'*, often synonymous with Shariah) generally makes it obligatory to consider and study existing things and to "reflect [on them] by means of the intellect" (*i'tibār bi-l-'aql*); and second, to show that the Islamic religion explicitly prescribes and protects such rational study and knowledge acquisition.<sup>37</sup> These two major theses of the *Decisive Treatise* form the theoretical framework of Ibn Rushd's reflections with immediate relevance to the topic of rationality and education.

Furthermore, Ibn Rushd introduces an important third and more practical element into the discussion. He makes an appeal that philosophy and logic not only may, but should, be applied for the general welfare of Muslim society. As evidence that rational contemplation and hence rational argument are a divinely sanctioned method of learning, Ibn Rushd cites several Qur'ān verses, including "His statement (may He be exalted), 'Learn from this, all of you with insight!'"<sup>38</sup> which is a reference to Sura 59, verse 2.

On this foundation, Ibn Rushd presents two basic *models of study*. One is text-oriented in regard to sources and traditional in regard to methods. It is based on the Qur'ān, complemented by the Ḥadīth and the generally accepted interpretations of the revealed scripture. The other model of study is rational and creative. Because it requires imaginative reflection and intellectual understanding, Ibn Rushd recommends this model only for the well-educated members of a society.

36 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Deliverance from Error: Five Key Texts Including His Spiritual Autobiography, al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl and other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī*, trans. and annot. Richard J. McCarthy (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 1999), 86 (no. 117).

37 See the references in note 6.

38 Ibn Rushd, *The Decisive Treatise*, 3; the Qur'ān quotation is rendered here in Abdel Haleem's translation.

In regard to *teaching strategies*, Ibn Rushd advocates challenging students intellectually. They should be encouraged to examine and reflect on information critically; they should question the validity of assertions before drawing their own conclusions with the goal of better understanding the “existing things” and hence the conceptions of the earthly and the divine.

It is noteworthy that Ibn Rushd explicitly recommends that students learn the logic of the “Ancients who reflected upon these things before the religion of Islam”<sup>39</sup>—meaning the ancient Greek philosophers—even though they were not Muslims. It is also a wise choice in general, he writes, to take advantage of the knowledge of others. Indeed, open-mindedness is a natural prerequisite for any gain in knowledge and culture, since it is simply not possible for a single person to derive all the necessary knowledge from first principles and firsthand investigations. Ibn Rushd explains in this connection:

For it is difficult or impossible for one person to grasp all that he needs of this [i.e., of intellectual syllogistic reasoning] by himself and from the beginning, just as it is difficult for one person to infer all he needs to be cognizant of concerning the kinds of juridical syllogistic reasoning. Nay, this is even more the case with being cognizant of intellectual syllogistic reasoning.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, Ibn Rushd makes another assertion which concerns the horizons of learning and education. He states that every person who has certain qualities must be allowed to study the intellectual legacy of the past without restriction: those qualities are innate intelligence, religious integrity, and moral virtue.<sup>41</sup> It is evident to Ibn Rushd

that reflection (*nazar*) upon the books of the Ancients is obligatory according to the Law (*sharʿ*, i.e., the Islamic religion), for their aim and intention in their books is the very intention to which the Law urges us. And [it has become evident] that whoever forbids reflection upon them by anyone suited to reflect upon them—namely, anyone who unites two qualities, the first being innate intelligence (*dhakā l-fiṭrah*) and the second Law-based justice (*al-ʿadālah al-sharʿiyyah*) and moral virtue (*al-faḍīlah al-khuluqīyyah*)—surely bars people from the door through which the Law calls them to cognizance of God (*maʿrifat Allāh*)—namely, the door of reflection leading to true cognizance of

39 *Al-qadamāʾ qabla millat al-Islām; al-ḥukamāʾ al-mutaqaddimūn*; cf. Ibn Rushd, *The Decisive Treatise*, 4–6. See also Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rushd, *On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy: A Translation of his Decisive Treatise Determining the Nature of the Connection between Religion and Philosophy. A Translation, with Introduction and Notes, of Ibn Rushd’s Kitāb Faṣl al-maqāl, with its Appendix (Ḍamīmah) and an Extract from Kitāb al-Kashf ʿan Manāḥij al-Adillah*, trans. George F. Hourani, London: Luzac, 1961), 2–3.

40 Ibn Rushd, *The Decisive Treatise*, 4.

41 Ibn Rushd, 6.

Him. That is extreme ignorance (*ghāyat al-jahl*) and estrangement from God (may He be exalted).<sup>42</sup>

Yet, to the Muslim rationalist Ibn Rushd, the foundational principle and stimulus (*al-mabda'*)—the elixir—for a successful pursuit of knowledge, truth, and happiness is and remains the Qur'ānic revelation. In his *Decisive Treatise* he writes:

Since . . . we, the Muslim community, believe that this divine Law of ours is true, and is the one alerting to and calling for this happiness (*al-sa'ādah*)—which is cognizance of God (Mighty and Magnificent)—and of His creation, therefore, that is determined for every Muslim in accordance with the method of assent his temperament and nature require.<sup>43</sup>

Although a great deal of the original Arabic versions of Ibn Rushd's writings were apparently lost as early as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—some of his works were rediscovered only in the nineteenth century with the emergence of previously unknown manuscripts, and especially through the investigations of the French historian Ernest Renan (d. 1892) and the German Orientalist Salomon Munk (d. 1867)—the Hebrew and Latin translations of Ibn Rushd's works were intensively studied by Jewish and Christian scholars in the Middle Ages.<sup>44</sup>

In the thirteenth century, the Italian Dominican Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) was one of Ibn Rushd's most prominent readers and intellectual supporters, but also one of his most resourceful critics. Aquinas quotes Ibn Rushd explicitly in numerous passages of his magnum opus, the *Summa theologica*, a compendium of all the major theological doctrines of the time. Engaging directly with the ideas of Ibn Rushd, Aquinas develops his own conception of an individual or autonomous human faculty of reason. And it is these reflections of Thomas Aquinas which would ultimately impart significant momentum to the "secularization" of knowledge in medieval Europe.<sup>45</sup>

## Conclusion

What then is the nature of that happiness which is considered a principal goal of knowledge acquisition and education by both the rationally and the spiritually oriented Muslim scholarship of Islam's classical period? Was the objective

42 Ibn Rushd, 6–7.

43 Ibn Rushd, 8.

44 Cf. Schupp's introduction to Ibn Rushd, *Die entscheidende Abhandlung*, esp. xvii–lv; Anke Von Kügelen, *Averroes und die arabische Moderne: Ansätze zur Neubegründung des Rationalismus im Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 42–50.

45 Günther, "Ibn Rushd," 276.

which medieval Muslim philosophers and scientists set themselves *rational knowledge of the world* and the secrets of life? Or was it *spiritual knowledge of God* and His work, which was synonymous, to religious scholars and mystics, with God's presence and God's love—the divine love which is manifested in human love for one's fellow humans? Or does happiness mean rather the *wisdom of the heart*—of that heart which is the regent in the kingdom of the body and has direct access to the spiritual world?<sup>46</sup>

The answers to these questions given by the three classical Muslim scholars presented in this article have points in common as well as significant differences.

All three, the philosopher and logician Farabi, the theologian and mystic Ghazali, and the philosopher and legal scholar Ibn Rushd, explicitly mention the general importance of education for the development of holistically educated, well-rounded individuals and for the welfare of society. Furthermore, the educational philosophies of all three scholars emphasize reason and rational argument as important components of the learning process as well as the close connection between intellectual development and the ethical and moral principles of human development. These similarities in the three scholars' theories of education are noteworthy regardless of the fact that Farabi and Ibn Rushd approach the questions of knowledge and education from a rational, metaphysical perspective while Ghazali addresses these topics from the position of a spiritual leader and religious reformer—one whose views on lifelong learning have been thoroughly shaped by mystical experience.

Yet there are also significant differences. The first of these concerns learning strategies; that is, the ultimate goal of study and the steps necessary to achieve it. Farabi and Ibn Rushd place the focus on human perfection as the highest goal of education and human development: human perfection is best attained, as in the Aristotelian tradition, by making the best possible use of a person's innate intellectual and other faculties. Constant striving for knowledge and perfection also allows people to experience in this life, to a certain degree, the state of happiness and fulfilment. Yet complete fulfilment and beatitude are only possible in the next life, as Farabi and Ibn Rushd also state, supporting their views with pertinent quotations from the Qur'ān.

Unlike Farabi and Ibn Rushd, Ghazali sees spiritual contemplation and faith in God as the essential elements of the path to human perfection. He regards rational exploration of certain scientific fields as helpful and indeed necessary in order to advance along the path of human perfection. Ghazali too states that it is possible in this life to experience the state of happiness to a certain extent, but he explicitly names preparation for the next life as the

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46 Cf. Annemarie Schimmel, foreword to Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Al Ghasālī: Das Elixier der Glückseligkeit. Aus dem Persischen und Arabischen übertragen von Hellmut Ritter. Mit einem Vorwort von Annemarie Schimmel* (Braunschweig: Minarett, 2004), 6.

ultimate purpose of all learning and studying. For only there, in the next life, can human beings experience real beatitude and nearness to God.

At the same time, however, the belief in God and in a life after death which Ghazali considers the precondition for all human striving for perfection and salvation is not “blind” or “ignorant” piety. Rather, it is a trust in God and Creation which is both rational and sustained by the heart. For Ghazali, it is this trust in God which benefits both the individual and society, and which ultimately leads to redemption and eternal salvation. Through this close combination of faith, spirituality, and reason, Ghazali was able to advance a concept which exerted a lasting influence on religiously oriented education in Islam over the centuries, and continues to do so today.

The question thus arises what relevance—above and beyond all historic interest—these conceptions of education developed by medieval Muslims have for the Western world of the twenty-first century. I believe they are relevant in a number of ways that are worthy of consideration.

First, Farabi, Ghazali, and Ibn Rushd suggest to us that the conduct of teaching and instruction should be both proficient and caring. This suggestion may be valuable in itself in our academic world, which is so often hurried and burdened with administrative tasks. Second, we notice that the medieval Muslim scholars we have explored in this study attach a remarkably great value to ethics and morality in the teaching and learning process. Modern conceptions of education and individual fulfilment can certainly find important new ideas here as well, especially in view of the commitment of democratic societies to humanistic ideals—that is, universal and cross-cultural values that are centered on the human being and give priority to reason in knowledge acquisition and the advancement of civilization.

In that vein, we may conclude by citing Ghazali once more, who wrote in his book *The Elixir of Happiness* that, although the substance of human beings is imperfect at the moment of their creation, they can be led from that imperfection to perfection—by constant striving on the paths of God and by the caring treatment of body, heart and soul. But that elixir which is apt to raise the substance of human beings from animal depths to angelic purity and worth, enabling them to attain eternal bliss, as Ghazali also explicitly states at the beginning of his book, is known only to very few; and it

is not easily discovered . . . [However,] the treasuries of God, in which this elixir is to be sought, are the hearts of the prophets, and he who seeks it elsewhere will be disappointed and bankrupt on the day of judgment when he hears the word, “but today We have removed your veil and your sight is sharp.” (Qurʾān 50:22)<sup>47</sup>

47 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *The Alchemy of Happiness*, trans. Claud Field (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2004), 13 (orig. published: London: John Murray 1910, slightly modified). The quotation from the Qurʾān is given in Abdel Haleem’s translation.

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